Journal Article

Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions

Peter Norman

in The Review of Economic Studies

Published on behalf of Review of Economic Studies Ltd

Volume 71, issue 4, pages 1163-1188
Published in print October 2004 | ISSN: 0034-6527
Published online October 2004 | e-ISSN: 1467-937X | DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00318
Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions

More Like This

Show all results sharing these subjects:

  • Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainy
  • Publicly Provided Goods

GO

Show Summary Details

Preview

Constrained efficient provision of an excludable public good is studied in a model where preferences are private information. The provision level is asymptotically deterministic, making it possible to approximate the optimal mechanism with a mechanism that provides a fixed quantity of the good and charges fixed user fees for access. In general, the fixed fees involve third degree price discrimination, but, if names are uninformative about preferences, the analysis provides a justification for average cost pricing.

Keywords: D82; H41

Journal Article.  12462 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainy ; Publicly Provided Goods

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.