Journal Article

Environmental Protection: A Theory of Direct and Indirect Competition for Political Influence

Zhihao Yu

in The Review of Economic Studies

Published on behalf of Review of Economic Studies Ltd

Volume 72, issue 1, pages 269-286
Published in print January 2005 | ISSN: 0034-6527
Published online January 2005 | e-ISSN: 1467-937X | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00332
Environmental Protection: A Theory of Direct and Indirect Competition for Political Influence

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How is it that environmental groups can have a strong impact on environmental policy but without much lobbying? This paper develops a model of “direct” (lobbying the government) and “indirect” (persuading the public) competition for political influence and finds that they are complementary. However, an increase in the effectiveness of public persuasion, or a rise of public environmental awareness, induces substitution between the two. The findings establish that the empirical phenomenon of lack of political contribution from environmental groups may not be related to financial constraints, but to their greater effectiveness in public persuasion and growing public environmental awareness.

Keywords: D72; Q58

Journal Article.  8598 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Environmental Economics ; Analysis of Collective Decision-making

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