Journal Article

The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures

Mathias Dewatripont, Ian Jewitt and Jean Tirole

in The Review of Economic Studies

Published on behalf of Review of Economic Studies Ltd

Volume 66, issue 1, pages 183-198
Published in print January 1999 | ISSN: 0034-6527
Published online January 1999 | e-ISSN: 1467-937X | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00084
The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures

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Many incentives in organizations arise not through explicit formal incentive contracts but rather implicitly through career concerns. This paper models career concerns through agents trying to manipulate the market assessment of their future productivity. The information flow from current actions to market assessment is therefore crucial in determining the nature of these incentives. Improved information may either increase or reduce incentives. The impact of information provides a major distinction between the explicit and implicit incentives model. The paper derives general results on comparisons of information structures which serve as counterparts to the standard results on information structures in the principal-agent model: sufficient statistic, impact of a Blackwell garbling, comparison of inclusive information structures.

Journal Article.  0 words. 

Subjects: Economics

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