Journal Article

The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies

Mathias Dewatripont, Ian Jewitt and Jean Tirole

in The Review of Economic Studies

Published on behalf of Review of Economic Studies Ltd

Volume 66, issue 1, pages 199-217
Published in print January 1999 | ISSN: 0034-6527
Published online January 1999 | e-ISSN: 1467-937X | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00085
The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies

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The paper uses a simple multitask career concern model in order to analyse the incentives of government agencies' officials. Incentives are impaired by the agency pursuing multiple missions. A lack of focus is even more problematic in the case of fuzzy missions, that is when outsiders are uncertain about the exact nature of the missions actually pursued by the agency. Consequently agencies pursuing multiple missions receive less autonomy.

The paper further shows that professionalization creates a sense of mission for the agency, and that the specialization of officials raises their incentives. Last, the paper compares its predictions with the stylized facts on Government bureaucracies.

Journal Article.  0 words. 

Subjects: Economics

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