Journal Article

Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project

Leslie M. Marx and Steven A. Matthews

in The Review of Economic Studies

Published on behalf of Review of Economic Studies Ltd

Volume 67, issue 2, pages 327-358
Published in print April 2000 | ISSN: 0034-6527
Published online April 2000 | e-ISSN: 1467-937X | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00134
Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project

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We consider the dynamic private provision of funds to projects that generate public benefits. Participants have complete information about the environment, but imperfect information about individual actions: each period they observe only the aggregate contribution. Each player may contribute any amount in any period before the contributing horizon is reached. All Nash equilibrium outcomes are characterized. In many cases they are all also perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes. If the horizon is long, if the players' preferences are similar, and if they are patient or the period length is short, perfect Bayesian equilibria exist that essentially complete the project. In some of them the completion time shrinks to zero with the period length—efficiency is achieved in the limit.

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Subjects: Economics

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