Journal Article

Optimal Multi-Object Auctions

Mark Armstrong

in The Review of Economic Studies

Published on behalf of Review of Economic Studies Ltd

Volume 67, issue 3, pages 455-481
Published in print July 2000 | ISSN: 0034-6527
Published online July 2000 | e-ISSN: 1467-937X | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00139
Optimal Multi-Object Auctions

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This paper analyses optimal auctions of several objects. In the first model bidders have a binary distribution over their valuations for each object, in which case the optimal auction is efficient. The optimal auction takes one of two formats: either objects are sold in independent auctions, or a degree of bundling is introduced in the sense that the probability a bidder wins one object is increasing in her value for the other. The format of the optimal auction may depend upon the number of bidders. In the second model the restriction to binary distributions is relaxed, and the optimal auction is then inefficient.

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Subjects: Economics

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