Journal Article

Performance, Promotion, and the Peter Principle

James A. Fairburn and James M. Malcomson

in The Review of Economic Studies

Published on behalf of Review of Economic Studies Ltd

Volume 68, issue 1, pages 45-66
Published in print January 2001 | ISSN: 0034-6527
Published online January 2001 | e-ISSN: 1467-937X | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00159
Performance, Promotion, and the Peter Principle

Show Summary Details

Preview

This paper considers why organizations use promotions, rather than just monetary bonuses, to motivate employees even though this may conflict with efficient assignment of employees to jobs. When performance is unverifiable, use of promotion reduces the incentive for managers to be affected by influence activities that would blunt the effectiveness of monetary bonuses. When employees are risk neutral, use of promotion for incentives need not distort assignments. When they are risk averse, it may—sufficient conditions for this are given. The distortion may be either to promote more employees than is efficient (the Peter Principle effect) or fewer.

Promotions serve two roles in an organization. First, they help assign people to the roles where they can best contribute to the organization's performance. Second, promotions serve as incentives and rewards.” (Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 364))

Promotions are used as the primary incentive device in most organizations, including corporations, partnerships, and universities … This … is puzzling to us because promotion-based incentive schemes have many disadvantages and few advantages relative to bonus-based incentive schemes.” (Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988, p. 600))

Journal Article.  0 words. 

Subjects: Economics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.