Journal Article

Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities

Sandro Brusco and Giuseppe Lopomo

in The Review of Economic Studies

Published on behalf of Review of Economic Studies Ltd

Volume 69, issue 2, pages 407-436
Published in print April 2002 | ISSN: 0034-6527
Published online April 2002 | e-ISSN: 1467-937X | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00211
Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities

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Collusive equilibria exist in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with multiple objects, even with large complementarities in the buyers' utility functions. The bidders collude by dividing the objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. In the most collusive equilibrium the complementarities are never realized. The scope for collusion however narrows as the ratio between the number of bidders and the number of objects increases.

Journal Article.  0 words. 

Subjects: Economics

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