Journal Article

Equilibrium in Justifiable Strategies: A Model of Reason-based Choice in Extensive-form Games

Ran Spiegler

in The Review of Economic Studies

Published on behalf of Review of Economic Studies Ltd

Volume 69, issue 3, pages 691-706
Published in print July 2002 | ISSN: 0034-6527
Published online July 2002 | e-ISSN: 1467-937X | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00222
Equilibrium in Justifiable Strategies: A Model of Reason-based Choice in Extensive-form Games

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I explore the idea that people care about the justifiability of their decisions in the context of two-person extensive games. Each player justifies his strategy s with a belief b of the opponent's strategy which is consistent with the play path and maximally plausible (according to some exogenous criterion). We say that s is justifiable if against the ex post criticism that some other strategy s′ outperforms s against b, the player can argue that playing s′ would have exposed him to similar criticism in the opposite direction. Under a simplicity-based plausibility criterion, this concept implies systematic departures from maximizing behaviour in familiar games.

Keywords: C72

Journal Article.  0 words. 

Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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