Journal Article

Market Selection and Asymmetric Information

George J. Mailath and Alvaro Sandroni

in The Review of Economic Studies

Published on behalf of Review of Economic Studies Ltd

Volume 70, issue 2, pages 343-368
Published in print April 2003 | ISSN: 0034-6527
Published online April 2003 | e-ISSN: 1467-937X | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00247
Market Selection and Asymmetric Information

Show Summary Details

Preview

We consider a dynamic general equilibrium asset pricing model with heterogeneous agents and asymmetric information. We show how agents' different methods of gathering information affect their chances of survival in the market depending upon the nature of the information and the level of noise in the economy.

Journal Article.  0 words. 

Subjects: Economics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.