Journal Article

Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players

Matthew O. Jackson and Simon Wilkie

in The Review of Economic Studies

Published on behalf of Review of Economic Studies Ltd

Volume 72, issue 2, pages 543-566
Published in print April 2005 | ISSN: 0034-6527
Published online April 2005 | e-ISSN: 1467-937X | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2005.00342.x
Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players

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  • Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
  • Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
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We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to efficient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of examples, including voluntary contribution public good games, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, principal-agent problems, and commons games, among others.

Keywords: C73; D43; L13

Journal Article.  14171 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance ; Market Structure and Pricing

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