Journal Article

The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium

Norman Schofield

in The Review of Economic Studies

Published on behalf of Review of Economic Studies Ltd

Volume 74, issue 3, pages 965-980
Published in print July 2007 | ISSN: 0034-6527
Published online July 2007 | e-ISSN: 1467-937X | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00444.x
The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium

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Formal models of elections have emphasized the convergence of party leaders towards the centre of the electoral distribution. This paper attempts to resolve the apparent disparity between the formal result and the perception of political divergence by considering a model incorporating valence. Valence can be interpreted as the non-policy basis of political judgement made by the electorate concerning the quality of political contenders. The theorem presented here shows that there is a necessary condition for convergence. The condition involves the difference in party valences and the electoral variance. When the condition fails, the low-valence parties will be forced to adopt policy positions far from the electoral centre. The inference appears to be substantiated by an empirical model of the Israel election in 1996.

Keywords: D72

Journal Article.  7218 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Analysis of Collective Decision-making

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