Journal Article

A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings

B. D. Bernheim and S. N. Slavov

in The Review of Economic Studies

Published on behalf of Review of Economic Studies Ltd

Volume 76, issue 1, pages 33-62
Published in print January 2009 | ISSN: 0034-6527
Published online January 2009 | e-ISSN: 1467-937X | DOI:
A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings

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  • Analysis of Collective Decision-making


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We define and explore the notion of a Dynamic Condorcet Winner (DCW), which extends the notion of a Condorcet winner to dynamic settings. We show that, for every DCW, every member of a large class of dynamic majoritarian games has an equivalent equilibrium, and that other equilibria are not similarly portable across this class of games. Existence of DCWs is guaranteed when members of the community are sufficiently patient. We characterize sustainable and unsustainable outcomes, study the effects of changes in the discount factor, investigate efficiency properties, and explore the potential for achieving renegotiation-proof outcomes. We apply this solution concept to a standard one-dimensional choice problem wherein agents have single-peaked preferences, as well as to one involving the division of a fixed aggregate pay-off.

Keywords: D71; D72

Journal Article.  18557 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Analysis of Collective Decision-making

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