Journal Article

Network Games

Andrea Galeotti, Sanjeev Goyal, Matthew O. Jackson, Fernando Vega-Redondo and Leeat Yariv

in The Review of Economic Studies

Published on behalf of Review of Economic Studies Ltd

Volume 77, issue 1, pages 218-244
Published in print January 2010 | ISSN: 0034-6527
Published online January 2010 | e-ISSN: 1467-937X | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00570.x
Network Games

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In contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection, a player's well-being depends on his or her own action as well as on the actions taken by his or her neighbours. We provide a framework to analyse such strategic interactions when neighbourhood structure, modelled in terms of an underlying network of connections, affects payoffs. In our framework, individuals are partially informed about the structure of the social network. The introduction of incomplete information allows us to provide general results characterizing how the network structure, an individual's position within the network, the nature of games (strategic substitutes vs. complements and positive vs. negative externalities) and the level of information shape individual behaviour and payoffs.

Journal Article.  13913 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Economics

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