Journal Article

Measuring the Extent of Coalition Formation in Group Decision Making

Fred J. Ruppel and P. Lynn Kennedy

in American Journal of Agricultural Economics

Published on behalf of Agricultural and Applied Economics Association

Volume 79, issue 4, pages 1288-1299
Published in print November 1997 | ISSN: 0002-9092
Published online November 1997 | e-ISSN: 1467-8276 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1244285
Measuring the Extent of Coalition Formation in Group Decision Making

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  • Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
  • Analysis of Collective Decision-making

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Many group decisions begin with small coalitions that recruit additional members until they satisfy a voting rule. This paper introduces a technique for measuring coalition formation in group decision making. The setting involves N players bargaining over the share distribution of an asset. The N-person game is analyzed as a set of triads, numerically equal to {N!/(N — 3)!}/3!. A three-person game is presented to establish the context and to offer insights into the bargaining process. A four-person game is also presented. The technique finds immediate application in controlled laboratory experiments but has further relevance for numerous real-world contexts.

Keywords: bargaining; coalition formation; experimental economics; group decision making; C780; D710

Journal Article.  0 words. 

Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; Analysis of Collective Decision-making

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