Journal Article

Price Information and Bidding Behavior in Repeated Second-Price Auctions

John A. List and Jason F. Shogren

in American Journal of Agricultural Economics

Published on behalf of Agricultural and Applied Economics Association

Volume 81, issue 4, pages 942-949
Published in print November 1999 | ISSN: 0002-9092
Published online November 1999 | e-ISSN: 1467-8276 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1244336
Price Information and Bidding Behavior in Repeated Second-Price Auctions

Show Summary Details

Preview

Examining panel data on bidding behavior in over forty second-price auction markets with repeated trials, we observe that (i) posted prices influence the behavior of the median naive bidder; (ii) posted prices do not affect the behavior of the median experienced bidder or the bidder for familiar goods; and (iii) anticipated strategic behavior wanes after two trials. The results suggest that while affiliation might exist in auctions for new goods, the repeated trial design with nonprice information removes the correlation of values and provides the experience that bidders need to understand the market mechanism.

Keywords: auctions; bidding; experimental markets; price; valuation; D440

Journal Article.  0 words. 

Subjects: Market Structure and Pricing

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.