Journal Article

Integrator Contracts with Many Agents and Bankruptcy

Theofanis Tsoulouhas and Tomislav Vukina

in American Journal of Agricultural Economics

Published on behalf of Agricultural and Applied Economics Association

Volume 81, issue 1, pages 61-74
Published in print February 1999 | ISSN: 0002-9092
Published online February 1999 | e-ISSN: 1467-8276 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1244450
Integrator Contracts with Many Agents and Bankruptcy

Show Summary Details

Preview

This article analyzes optimal livestock production contracts between an integrator company and many independent growers in three similar industries: broiler, turkey, and swine. The analysis provides an explanation for the simultaneous existence of distinct incentive schemes in these industries by examining the effects of bankruptcy. The key factors are shown to be the output price volatility and the firm size. With large companies dominating the broiler industry, a small price volatility facilitates the use of two-part piece rate tournaments. By contrast, given the prevalence of smaller companies in the swine industry, a larger price volatility generates a bankruptcy risk which renders the use of tournaments infeasible. Given the combination of medium-size companies in the turkey industry, an intermediate price volatility produces a mixed result where tournaments and fixed performance standards exist simultaneously.

Keywords: bankruptcy; contracts; moral hazard; multiple agents; tournaments; G330; Q130

Journal Article.  0 words. 

Subjects: Bankruptcy ; Agricultural Economics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.