Journal Article

Marketing Agreement Impacts in an Experimental Market for Fed Cattle

Clement E. Ward, Derrell S. Peel, James N. Trapp, Tracy L. Dowty and Stephen R. Koontz

in American Journal of Agricultural Economics

Published on behalf of Agricultural and Applied Economics Association

Volume 81, issue 2, pages 347-358
Published in print May 1999 | ISSN: 0002-9092
Published online May 1999 | e-ISSN: 1467-8276 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1244586
Marketing Agreement Impacts in an Experimental Market for Fed Cattle

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Marketing agreements between meatpacking and cattle feeding firms have created concerns about their effects on fed cattle prices. Profit-sharing marketing agreements were imposed onto a simulated fed cattle market. Price level and variability differences with and without agreements, between agreement participants and nonparticipants, during agreement and nonagreement periods, and between participants receiving and not receiving a monetary incentive were evaluated. Prices and variability for nonagreement cattle were higher during the agreement periods. Marketing agreement participants realized lower, less variable prices than nonparticipating firms. Monetary incentives did not affect price levels but increased price variability.

Keywords: captive supplies; cattle feeding; fed cattle; marketing agreements; meatpacking; prices; Q130

Journal Article.  0 words. 

Subjects: Agricultural Economics

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