Journal Article

Economics of Antipoaching Enforcement and the Ivory Trade Ban

Erwin H. Bulte and G. Cornelis van Kooten

in American Journal of Agricultural Economics

Published on behalf of Agricultural and Applied Economics Association

Volume 81, issue 2, pages 453-466
Published in print May 1999 | ISSN: 0002-9092
Published online May 1999 | e-ISSN: 1467-8276 | DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1244594
Economics of Antipoaching Enforcement and the Ivory Trade Ban

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A model of elephant conservation that includes illegal poaching, enforcement effort, and legal culling is used to analyze enforcement and elephant populations for alternative policies, with and without legal trade in ivory. Consistent with previous theoretical models, banning trade may increase or decrease equilibrium stocks. As an empirical application, information for Zambia, along with sensitivity analysis, are used to show that the ivory trade ban is more effective in conserving the African elephant (Loxodonta africana) than in permitting open trade. However, in all situations, current elephant populations likely exceed optimal levels as perceived by the range states, and further reductions in elephant numbers might be expected.

Keywords: dynamic optimization; elephants; ivory trade ban; poaching enforcement; F140

Journal Article.  0 words. 

Subjects: International Trade

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