Journal Article

Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations

Murali Agastya

in The Review of Economic Studies

Published on behalf of Review of Economic Studies Ltd

Volume 64, issue 3, pages 411-426
Published in print July 1997 | ISSN: 0034-6527
Published online July 1997 | e-ISSN: 1467-937X | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2971721
Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations

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We study the dual issues of allocation and coalition formation in a model of social learning. For a class of economies which can be expressed in terms of a real valued characteristic function, we first show that all self-perpetuating allocations realized from a simple bargaining game must be core allocations although players make simultaneous demands for surplus and only on their own behalf. Following this, we provide a sufficient condition under which the society eventually learns to divide the surplus according to some core allocation, regardless of the initial history.

Journal Article.  0 words. 

Subjects: Economics

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