Journal Article

Individual and Collective Time-Consistency

Geir B. Asheim

in The Review of Economic Studies

Published on behalf of Review of Economic Studies Ltd

Volume 64, issue 3, pages 427-443
Published in print July 1997 | ISSN: 0034-6527
Published online July 1997 | e-ISSN: 1467-937X | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2971722
Individual and Collective Time-Consistency

Show Summary Details

Preview

This paper reconsiders the Strotz-Pollak problem of consistent planning and argues that a solution to this problem requires a refinement of subgame-perfectness. Such a refinement is offered through an analysis based on Greenberg's “theory of social situations”. The properties of this refinement are investigated and illustrated. A unifying framework is presented whereby consistent one-person planning as a problem of individual time-consistency and renegotiation-proofness as a problem of collective time-consistency are captured through the same general concept.

Journal Article.  0 words. 

Subjects: Economics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.