Chapter

Democracy and the Lesser Evil

Gifford Lectures

in The Lesser Evil

Published by Edinburgh University Press

Published in print April 2004 | ISBN: 9780748618729
Published online September 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780748671892 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9780748618729.003.0001
Democracy and the Lesser Evil

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This chapter explains why the use of coercive force in a liberal democracy, not just in times of emergency, but in normal times as well, is regarded as a lesser evil. This particular view of democracy does not prohibit emergency suspensions of rights in times of terror, but it imposes an obligation on government to justify such measures publicly, to submit them to judicial review, and to circumscribe them with sunset clauses so that they do not become permanent. The chapter tries to chart a middle course between a pure civil libertarian position which maintains that no violations of rights can ever be justified and a purely pragmatic position which judges antiterrorist measures solely by their effectiveness. It argues that actions which violate foundational commitments to justice and dignity – torture, illegal detention, unlawful assassination – should be beyond the pale. But defining these limits in theory is not hard. The problem is to protect them in practice, to maintain the limits, case by case, where reasonable people may disagree as to what constitutes torture, what detentions are illegal, which killings depart from lawful norms, or which preemptive actions constitute aggression. Neither necessity nor liberty, neither public danger nor private rights constitute trumping claims in deciding these questions.

Keywords: coercive force; liberal democracy; rights; antiterrorist measures

Chapter.  8918 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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