Chapter

Knowledge

Rowland Stout

in The Inner Life of a Rational Agent

Published by Edinburgh University Press

Published in print April 2006 | ISBN: 9780748623433
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780748652501 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9780748623433.003.0009
Knowledge

Show Summary Details

Preview

Knowledge is a state of mind; it is a disposition to behave distinct from the disposition that is the corresponding belief, but at the same time necessitating the existence of such a belief. This chapter defends the following principle concerning knowledge: A subject knows whether p if and only if the subject is disposed to behave in a way that is governed by a version of practical rationality that is sensitive to whether or not p. This approach can be generalised to knowledge of who, why, what, how, etc. It can also be extended to knowledge of things, as follows: A subject knows a thing if and only if the subject is disposed to behave in a way that is governed by a version of practical rationality that is sensitive to answers to questions about that thing. The species of knowledge most often discussed – namely knowledge that – can be understood as knowledge of a fact, and as such falls out of the general account of knowledge of things.

Keywords: sensitivity; knowledge; practical rationality; evidence

Chapter.  11610 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.