Chapter

Peirce's Categories

Kory Spencer Sorrell

in Representative Practices

Published by Fordham University Press

Published in print September 2004 | ISBN: 9780823223541
Published online March 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780823235582 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5422/fso/9780823223541.003.0002

Series: American Philosophy

Peirce's Categories

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This chapter provides an introduction to Charles Peirce's most general categories and shows how these phenomenological traits become for him full metaphysical concepts. To understand and evaluate these practices, the intended object of representation—the real—must be discussed at length. Peirce thought that the nature of the real was central to understanding. The chapter responds adequately to the cluster of difficulties within the problem of representation. The production of an account of the nature of the real is a tricky business because any discussion of the object that is presented is already a representation itself. Peirce distinguishes two categories: particular and universal. Particular categories form a set or series, only one of each series being present, and the universal on the other hand belongs to every phenomenon. This chapter also focuses on the response to concerns that may emerge from the point of view of a philosopher of science, who may address this issue from a feminist viewpoint.

Keywords: Charles Peirce; phenomenological traits; representation; reality; metaphysical concept

Chapter.  9029 words. 

Subjects: Feminist Philosophy

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