Chapter

The Substance of Peirce's Categories

Kory Spencer Sorrell

in Representative Practices

Published by Fordham University Press

Published in print September 2004 | ISBN: 9780823223541
Published online March 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780823235582 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5422/fso/9780823223541.003.0003

Series: American Philosophy

The Substance of Peirce's Categories

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This chapter offers a distinctive and pragmatic substance formulation of things of the world, with a number of historical and contemporary criticisms. These substances of the world are not just epistemic constructions but rather ontological artifacts of our own making. The doctrine of substance emerges from Peirce's categories and provides a concept of the real in conjunction with the semiotic approach to representation. It is also important to note that the doctrine of substance itself is a representative claim about what is real. Peirce rejects thoroughly the view that substance is something not susceptible to any explanation. According to Peirce, conceptions such as substance could not be considered perfectly simple, since they are susceptible to further explanation. These conceptions are the general categories that were introduced to the reader in Chapter One of this book.

Keywords: Peirce; substance; criticism; epistemic constructions; semiotic approach; conceptions; real

Chapter.  16392 words. 

Subjects: Feminist Philosophy

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