Chapter

Scotus and Kant: The Moral Will and Its Limits

John Davenport

in Will as Commitment and Resolve

Published by Fordham University Press

Published in print July 2007 | ISBN: 9780823225750
Published online March 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780823235896 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5422/fso/9780823225750.003.0011
Scotus and Kant: The Moral Will and               Its Limits

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This chapter argues that medieval critics of Thomism began to see the free will in which virtues develop as having the power to generate moral motivation. Immanuel Kant inherits from John Duns Scotus this idea of projective motivation in the moral realm. The chapter analyzes Kant's conception of the motive of duty and libertarian freedom and traces the idea that virtues and vices are primarily volitional dispositions into Scotus's innovative conception of the will to justice or righteousness as the true form of moral motivation. The medieval shift away from eudaimonism is also discussed, along with Bonnie Kent's views on virtues of the will and the arguments of Henry Allison and Karl Ameriks regarding freedom.

Keywords: Immanuel Kant; John Duns Scotus; projective motivation; eudaimonism; moral will; freedom; virtues; vices; Bonnie Kent; Henry Allison

Chapter.  21841 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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