Chapter

The Unevenly Even Consistency of Truth

Jeremy Barris

in The Crane's Walk

Published by Fordham University Press

Published in print April 2009 | ISBN: 9780823229130
Published online March 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780823235674 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5422/fso/9780823229130.003.0015
The Unevenly Even               Consistency of Truth

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In his Posterior Analytics, Aristotle argues that knowledge is of universals, and therefore cannot be gained through sense perception. But he claims that knowledge begins with a kind of induction from sensation. As Plato has Socrates insist, the most fundamental Idea, the Idea of the Good, is the source of knowledge and truth. For Aristotle, knowledge by its nature depends on something that its nature equally excludes from being something known. On the other hand, one knows sensed particulars only through universals, which in turn one knows only through sensed particulars. Knowledge, then, also occurs in a circle. Both dimensions of Aristotle's account, then, the circularity of explanation and its incompatible relation to what is external to knowledge, are necessary for knowledge. On the other hand, as Plato does genuinely question the legitimacy of careful thinking, he is able to develop a foundational account of it.

Keywords: Aristotle; knowledge; universals; Plato; sensation; thinking; truth; perception

Chapter.  4398 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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