Chapter

The Independence of the Judiciary as a Democratic Construct

Hesham El-Bastawissy

in Judges and Political Reform in Egypt

Published by American University in Cairo Press

Published in print January 2009 | ISBN: 9789774162015
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9781617970993 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5743/cairo/9789774162015.003.0017
The Independence of the Judiciary as a Democratic Construct

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In any country, the independence of the judiciary as a state institution and the autonomy of judges in their individual capacity are profoundly related to the state of democracy. Neither of them could be achieved in conformity with international standards unless democratic rules and culture prevail in the state legislation and are practiced by rulers and subjects. The attention here is confined to one requirement: the empowerment of judges to establish their organizations, whether in the form of bar associations, clubs, or societies. This chapter emphasizes this requirement, first, because the sole protection against further deterioration in the condition and autonomy of the judiciary is the existence of a club for judges that is fully independent from all state authorities, including the Supreme Judicial Council, and whose activity is only subject to its general assembly. This chapter emphasizes it, second, because it is not given due attention.

Keywords: judiciary; state institution; democracy; state authorities; Supreme Judicial Council; general assembly

Chapter.  2584 words. 

Subjects: International Relations

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