Chapter

Lessons Learned—or Not

Anthony James Joes

in Victorious Insurgencies

Published by University Press of Kentucky

Published in print October 2010 | ISBN: 9780813126142
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780813135588 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813126142.003.0006
Lessons Learned—or Not

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The quality of military leadership among the counterinsurgents was inadequate. Inadequate counterinsurgent numbers of course resulted from several factors. One was the aforementioned failure, notably in French Vietnam and Soviet Afghanistan, to cut off outside aid to the insurgents, while in turn inadequate numbers made it all the more impossible to cut off or limit that outside aid. The often systematic violations of rectitude on the part of counterinsurgent forces of course both reflected and aggravated this situation. The insurgents could rightly claim that they had no recourse except arms. The Japanese, the French, and the Soviets abandoned their counterinsurgencies and went home in the end.

Keywords: counterinsurgents; inadequate; Afghanistan; violations; recourse

Chapter.  7209 words. 

Subjects: International Relations

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