The General Offensive and General Uprising

Ira A. Hunt

in The 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam

Published by University Press of Kentucky

Published in print October 2010 | ISBN: 9780813126470
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780813135656 | DOI:
The General Offensive and General Uprising

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In 1967, the Communists assumed that the RVNAF and Allied Forces were weak and could be defeated so they abandoned their limited offensive tactics and adopted the concept of large battles, generally conducted by main force units. The Communists changed their tactics from company- and platoon-sized or smaller operations to battles conducted with multibattalion attacks. On December 10, 1967, at An Naut Tan, the 2/60 Infantry was attacked by the 2nd Independent Battalion supported by the 506th Battalion and the 5th Nha Be Battalion. Hanoi subsequently decided to implement the “General Offensive and General Uprising” plan of the war in 1967–1969. The offensive was to be conducted throughout South Vietnam in several phases by Viet Cong main force units. The Communists believed that with tactical victories, the people of South Vietnam would rally behind the Communist cause, thus leading to the overthrow of the government, the so-called General Uprising.

Keywords: GVN; Saigon; Communists; South Vietnam; RVNAF military

Chapter.  3445 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Military History

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