Chapter

Post–Dong Xuan Operations

Ira A. Hunt

in The 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam

Published by University Press of Kentucky

Published in print October 2010 | ISBN: 9780813126470
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780813135656 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813126470.003.0009
Post–Dong Xuan Operations

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The aggressive actions of the RVNAF and the 9th Division in the Delta and U.S. forces and Allies elsewhere in South Vietnam forced the Communist leaders to abort their Winter–Spring Offensive. Yet, the dispersed and elusive Viet Cong and NVA units that remained in the Upper Delta still had a limited capability to attack population centers and military installations if they were permitted to concentrate forces. After the beating they took in the February 1968 Tet Offensive, the Viet Cong were able to mass and attack Saigon again in May. Even after the Mini-Tet losses, they attempted another highpoint in Long An in August and September. To prevent yet another Communist attempt at a highpoint and to permit the GVN pacification program to progress, it was necessary for the division to continue to aggressively locate and destroy enemy local and main force units.

Keywords: RVNAF; Allies; U.S. forces; Communist; GVN pacification

Chapter.  1245 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Military History

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