Chapter

Congressional Delegation of Power

Jasmine Farrier

in Congressional Ambivalence

Published by University Press of Kentucky

Published in print March 2010 | ISBN: 9780813192628
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780813135496 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813192628.003.0002
Congressional Delegation of Power

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This chapter suggests the need to develop a theory of constitutional inconsistency to gain a better understanding of the nuances surrounding the cycle of congressional ambivalence. These inconsistencies would also help in studying what Congress is now and its limitations going forward under any version of interbranch party arrangements. If each branch of the government ties its own personal and political goals to the protection and enlargement of its institution's place in the federal constellation of powers, then each branch would develop “a will of its own.” Congress, however, has failed to maintain its institutional ambition even during times of divided government where the House and the Senate are held by one party and the White House by the other. If congressional activity is consistent during and after lawmaking, then a balance of power is easier to achieve.

Keywords: congressional ambivalence; constitutional inconsistency; delegation of power; government; Congress; lawmaking; balance of power

Chapter.  8068 words. 

Subjects: US Politics

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