Chapter

Feferman on Gödel and free will

J.R. LUCAS

in Free Will and Modern Science

Published by British Academy

Published in print December 2011 | ISBN: 9780197264898
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191754074 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197264898.003.0008

Series: British Academy Original Paperbacks

Feferman on Gödel and free will

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This chapter presents a response to Solomon Feferman's discussion in Chapter 6. Feferman is right to dismiss logical determinism perfunctorily, although it puzzled Aristotle and the mediaeval Schoolmen and many people still. Feferman also gives a careful account of the much-criticized Gödelian argument against mechanism. Like many other critics he highlights the assumption that any plausible mechanical model of the mind must be consistent. It is shown that both Feferman's Formalist-Mechanist Thesis I aand the general mechanist thesis are false.

Keywords: logical determinism; Gödel; mechanism; mechanical model; mind

Chapter.  1195 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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