Worker Responses to Shirking under Shared Capitalism

Richard B. Freeman, Douglas L. Kruse and Joseph R. Blasi

in Shared Capitalism at Work

Published by University of Chicago Press

Published in print May 2010 | ISBN: 9780226056951
Published online February 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780226056968 | DOI:
Worker Responses to Shirking under Shared Capitalism

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This chapter examines worker reactions to shirking by analyzing questions on the 2002 and 2006 General Social Surveys (GSS) and the National Bureau for Economic Research (NBER) surveys of fourteen companies that have some forms of group incentive plans. In the GSS data, the most important factor behind anti-shirking activity is the presence of profit sharing and gain sharing. In the NBER data for which detailed information on the extent of profit sharing was available, it was the intensity rather than the presence of profit sharing and gain sharing. Anti-shirking activity is strongly related to both profit-sharing bonus size and gain-sharing bonus size. Analysis of the decision equation for workers to intervene against shirking suggests that some of the factors that influence behavior should enter equations in an interactive rather than linear way. The worker decides to intervene against a shirker when the expected benefits of intervening exceed the costs.

Keywords: shared capitalism; shirking; General Social Surveys; National Bureau for Economic Research; bonus; group incentive plans; profit sharing; gain sharing

Chapter.  11390 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Economic History

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