Capital Crimes: Kidnappings and Corporate Investment in Colombia

Rony Pshisva and Gustavo A. Suarez

in The Economics of Crime

Published by University of Chicago Press

Published in print September 2010 | ISBN: 9780226153742
Published online February 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780226153766 | DOI:
Capital Crimes: Kidnappings and Corporate Investment in Colombia

Show Summary Details


This chapter proposes an approach focused on a particularly salient crime of kidnappings. After having exploiting variation in kidnappings that target firm managers in different regions of Colombia, the authors find that firms invest less when kidnappings directly target them, while there is no effect when there are other forms of violent crime that do not explicitly target firms, such as homicides, guerrilla attacks, and general kidnappings. It is found that the estimated effect on one firm is larger for kidnappings suffered by other firms in the same industry. Recent empirical studies show that institutions that protect property rights foster investment and long-run economic growth. Thus, the investment is based on hedonic price models, where disamenities like crime are built into real estate market prices. The firms with substantial foreign ownership are particularly sensitive to kidnappings of foreign managers and owners.

Keywords: kidnappings; firm managers; Colombia; crime; property rights; investment; industry; Colombia

Chapter.  14011 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Economic Development and Growth

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.