Rule of Thumb and Principle

in The Theory of Rules

Published by University of Chicago Press

Published in print April 2011 | ISBN: 9780226487953
Published online March 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780226487977 | DOI:
Rule of Thumb and Principle

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This chapter illustrates the comparative law competence most prominently exhibited in Präjudizienrecht und Rechtsprechung in Amerika, and considers the occasion to criticize the civil law ideal as embodied by the codes of Frederick the Great and Napoleon. For the nature of rule-of-thumb classification of cases, the nature of such classification is that problems of the purpose of the classification, the reason of the classification and the use or value of the classification can be ignored in using the rule because they have been solved and left behind. Judgment was required for the initial framing of good rules of thumb. The nature of a rule-of-thumb was to run free of its purpose. The note rule had become a rule of thumb before the framers of the Negotiable Instruments Law began their work. It is shown that the irregularity of result meant imprecision in the positive rule of law.

Keywords: rule-of-thumb; Negotiable Instruments Law; comparative law; Frederick the Great; Napoleon; judgment; rule of law

Chapter.  4498 words. 

Subjects: Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law

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