The Essential Contributions of the New Institutional Economics

in The Political Economy of Pipelines

Published by University of Chicago Press

Published in print April 2012 | ISBN: 9780226502106
Published online March 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780226502120 | DOI:
The Essential Contributions of the New Institutional Economics

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This chapter investigates transaction cost economics and includes a review of the restrictions on transacting imposed by requirements for common carriage and third-party access (TPA). It evaluates in detail the concepts of the new institutional economics. The cost of transacting with pipelines once demanded vertical integration. Common carriage was never used for gas pipelines in the United States. A digression on common carriage and TPA is ineluctable if an economic analysis of the different pipeline transport markets in the world is going to make sense. Mancur Olson attracted a number of implications that seem to be significant in how groups press to shape pipeline regulation and markets. His implications from the logic of collective action appeared to be confirmed often enough. The notion of property rights to point-to-point pipeline transport capacity was central to understanding modern pipeline markets.

Keywords: transaction; cost economics; common carriage; third-party access; institutional economics; gas pipelines; United States; transport markets; Mancur Olson; collective action

Chapter.  6999 words. 

Subjects: Political Economy

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