Chapter

Scoring the Senate: Scorecards, Parties, and Roll-Call Votes

Jason M. Roberts and Lauren Cohen Bell

in Why Not Parties?

Published by University of Chicago Press

Published in print October 2008 | ISBN: 9780226534879
Published online March 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780226534947 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226534947.003.0004
Scoring the Senate: Scorecards, Parties, and Roll-Call Votes

Show Summary Details

Preview

This chapter compares the relative success of the majority party in the House and the Senate. After first discussing the theoretical underpinnings of the study, it analyzes the effects of legislative parties, electoral considerations, and interest groups on roll-call voting behaviors. The results indicate that party leaders in the Senate generally are able to secure their preferred outcomes on roll-call votes, but that some senators are willing to defect from their parties' preferred positions when particular interest groups announce their intention to include the votes on their end-of-year or end-of-Congress scorecards.

Keywords: majority party; U.S. Senate; House of Representatives; interest groups; roll-call voting behaviors; party leaders; Congress

Chapter.  7316 words. 

Subjects: US Politics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.