Chapter

Agenda Influence and Tabling Motions in the U.S. Senate

Chris Den Hartog and Nathan W. Monroe

in Why Not Parties?

Published by University of Chicago Press

Published in print October 2008 | ISBN: 9780226534879
Published online March 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780226534947 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226534947.003.0008
Agenda Influence and Tabling Motions in the U.S. Senate

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This chapter examines the majority party's use of motions to table as a means of killing unwanted amendments. It does so as part of a larger project in which a new theoretical framework is proposed for thinking about legislative parties' influence over legislative decisions generally—one that is particularly well suited to the Senate, inasmuch as it leads to important modifications of the conventional wisdom. This framework revolves around the premise that the majority and minority parties face costs in getting measures onto the legislative agenda (i.e., getting a final-passage vote) and that these costs are higher for the minority party than for the majority party.

Keywords: majority party; minority party; motions; amendments; legislative decisions; legislative agenda

Chapter.  6622 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: US Politics

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