Chapter

Distributive and Partisan Politics in the U.S. Senate: An Exploration of Earmarks

Michael H. Crespin and Charles J. Finocchiaro

in Why Not Parties?

Published by University of Chicago Press

Published in print October 2008 | ISBN: 9780226534879
Published online March 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780226534947 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226534947.003.0012
Distributive and Partisan Politics in the U.S. Senate: An Exploration of Earmarks

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This chapter examines whether and to what degree the distribution of pork-barrel project dollars across states is biased toward the majority party. It begins with a review of the literature on distributive and partisan theories before turning to more recent efforts at explaining congressional earmarks. It then describes the data and methods employed in the analysis, and presents descriptive and then multiple regression results accounting for the role of parties, institutional status, and other factors in the allocation of pork. It is shown that the majority party does maintain an advantage when it comes to earmark dollars, though the advantage is not present on all of the appropriations bills.

Keywords: pork barrel projects; funding; majority party; congressional earmarks

Chapter.  7048 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: US Politics

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