Leveraging Conflicts of Interest

in Mass Torts in a World of Settlement

Published by University of Chicago Press

Published in print October 2007 | ISBN: 9780226567600
Published online March 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780226567624 | DOI:
Leveraging Conflicts of Interest

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This chapter illustrates how implementation of the leveraging proposal for fee design may take place as part of a partial shift of peace negotiations into administrative bodies. Considerations of capitalization can contribute to a kind of misallocation in the administration of the peace arrangement, even apart from its initial design. The suppositions of litigation actually inhibit the law from pursuing reform to set right the incentives for mass tort plaintiffs' lawyers. The law should endeavor to turn the leveraging at the heart of peace negotiations into its own source of constraint. The leveraging proposal speaks most directly to the allocation problems that have plagued peace arrangements for mass torts. Implementation of the leveraging proposal would take place in tandem with the existing per se prohibition in antitrust law against price fixing by horizontal competitors.

Keywords: leveraging proposal; fee design; peace negotiations; litigation; mass torts; plaintiffs; allocation problems

Chapter.  13283 words. 

Subjects: Company and Commercial Law

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