Chapter

Introduction

in Rules and Restraint

Published by University of Chicago Press

Published in print October 2007 | ISBN: 9780226682594
Published online March 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780226682617 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226682617.003.0001
Introduction

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This book demonstrates that rules vary in their effectiveness and in their enforceability, concentrating on how rules shape outcomes. The theoretical models rely on two components: an examination of how rules shape policy outcomes, and an examination of how the enforcement of rules influences their effectiveness. In particular, this chapter describes the environment in which budget rules are adopted, utilized, and enforced or not enforced. The inability of Congress to follow its own budget rules is a direct consequence of weak internal enforcement. It uses the political economy approach and game theory. The models serve as tools for understanding the impact of state and federal budget rules on spending. A complete understanding of rules requires that design and enforcement be considered in tandem. Finally, an overview of the chapters included in the book is given.

Keywords: budget rules; policy; Congress; political economy approach; game theory; spending

Chapter.  8577 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: US Politics

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