Chapter

Rule Design and Enforcement

in Rules and Restraint

Published by University of Chicago Press

Published in print October 2007 | ISBN: 9780226682594
Published online March 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780226682617 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226682617.003.0002
Rule Design and Enforcement

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This chapter, which describes why institutions exist, and the challenges encountered both in designing rules and enforcing them, argues that exogenously enforced rules are more stable than those which must be enforced within an organization, but that both types of enforcement can succeed under certain conditions. It also considers the issue of institutional formation by distinguishing between rule design and enforcement. The realities of human interaction shape the design of institutions. The credibility of enforcement is central to a rule's success or failure. Rules should not be considered in isolation when evaluating their impact because institutional interactions often come into play. Agenda control plays a role in the budgeting process. The Supreme Court could be expected to be a faithful arbiter of a clear-cut budget rule, and a simple rule could be written to, say, require a balanced budget.

Keywords: institutions; budget rule; enforcement; rule design; agenda control; budgeting; Supreme Court

Chapter.  8451 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: US Politics

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