Chapter

Administrative Disputes: Taxpayers against the Government

in Measuring Judicial Independence

Published by University of Chicago Press

Published in print February 2003 | ISBN: 9780226703886
Published online March 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780226703879 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226703879.003.0006
Administrative Disputes: Taxpayers against the Government

Show Summary Details

Preview

Consistently, the Japanese government wins in court. Crucially, it does not win by manipulating the career judiciary to produce biased courts. Japanese judges do not enjoy better careers if they favor the government in mundane cases. Instead, it most likely wins because as a rational repeat player it disproportionately selects for litigation those cases that will shift precedent in an advantageous direction. In mundane administrative litigation involving disputes between the government and taxpayers, the system favors accurate judges rather than biased judges. Those judges who find their opinions reversed on appeal do incur a penalty. Those judges who occasionally favor taxpayers incur none.

Keywords: taxpayers; Japanese government; administrative litigation; biased courts; Japanese judges; litigation

Chapter.  5424 words. 

Subjects: Comparative Law

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.