Chapter

Toward a Party-Alternation Theory of Comparative Judicial Independence

in Measuring Judicial Independence

Published by University of Chicago Press

Published in print February 2003 | ISBN: 9780226703886
Published online March 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780226703879 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226703879.003.0008
Toward a Party-Alternation Theory of Comparative Judicial Independence

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This chapter focuses on the broader implications of the relation between judicial independence and democratic politics. Toward that end, it traces the conditions under which rational politicians will most likely keep their judges independent. Judicial independence is not an unambiguous good for politicians facing competitive elections. Accordingly, the chapter traces the political benefits and costs to judicial independence, and explores the conditions under which politicians would most likely provide it. The theory is applied in the context of three very different regimes: imperial Japan, postwar Japan, and the United States.

Keywords: judicial independence; democratic politics; competitive elections; political benefits; imperial Japan; postwar Japan; United States

Chapter.  20643 words. 

Subjects: Comparative Law

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