Chapter

The Puzzle

William Phelan

in In Place of Inter-State Retaliation

Published in print December 2014 | ISBN: 9780198712794
Published online March 2015 | e-ISBN: 9780191781155 | DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712794.003.0002
The Puzzle

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This chapter sets out the empirical puzzle that the book will address. It first considers scholarly debates on the EU as a sui generis institution. It then builds on debates in international legal theory to show that the best, and most specific, understanding of the EU as a distinctive form of international organization is as a “self-contained regime.” A self-contained regime is defined as an international treaty that imposes a stream of costly adjustments on its participating states, but rejects the use of inter-state countermeasures and “reciprocal measures.” It also demonstrates that the EU, unusually among contemporary trade agreements, rejects the use of trade remedy instruments such as anti-dumping and countervailing duties. The book therefore offers an explanation of the EU as an international organization that imposes demanding trade and other policy adjustments on its member states without employing inter-state retaliation mechanisms or common forms of trade remedy.

Keywords: European law; international law; dispute settlement; retaliation; escape mechanisms; trade remedies; trade; self-contained regime

Chapter.  8562 words. 

Subjects: Political Economy

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