Chapter

The Democratic Deficit and Parliamentary Adaptation to Integration

Thomas Winzen

in Constitutional Preferences and Parliamentary Reform

Published in print January 2017 | ISBN: 9780198793397
Published online February 2017 | e-ISBN: 9780191835223 | DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198793397.003.0002
The Democratic Deficit and Parliamentary Adaptation to Integration

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This chapter explains the thesis that national parliaments lose authority from European integration, and embeds it into the broader debate on the democratic deficit of the EU and international institutions more generally. It then shows empirically what kind of national and European-level parliamentary rights exist, mapping their development over time and across countries. It is demonstrated that all national parliaments have implemented so-called ‘oversight institutions’—parliamentary rights and capacities designed to enhance parliamentary control of governments in EU affairs—albeit to varying degrees. In contrast, national parliaments’ collective European role remains weakly developed. The systematic overview provided in this chapter sets the stage for the empirical analyses of this study.

Keywords: European integration; national parliaments; democratic deficit; oversight institutions; collective European role

Chapter.  11240 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Comparative Politics ; European Union

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