Journal Article

Patent Pools, Competition, and Innovation—Evidence from 20 US Industries under the New Deal

Ryan Lampe and Petra Moser

in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volume 32, issue 1, pages 1-36
Published in print March 2016 | ISSN: 8756-6222
Published online August 2015 | e-ISSN: 1465-7341 | DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewv014
Patent Pools, Competition, and Innovation—Evidence from 20 US Industries under the New Deal

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  • Antitrust Issues and Policies
  • Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behaviour
  • Technological Change; Research and Development

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Patent pools have become a prominent mechanism to reduce litigation risks and facilitate the commercialization of new technologies. This article takes advantage of a window of regulatory tolerance under the New Deal to investigate the effects of pools that would form in the absence of effective antitrust. Difference-in-differences regressions of patents and patent citations across 20 industries imply a 14% decline in patenting for each additional patent that is included in a pool. An analysis of the mechanism by which pools discourage innovation indicates that this decline is driven by technologies for which the creation of a pool weakened competition in R&D. (JEL K21, L24, L41, O31)

Journal Article.  15798 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Antitrust Issues and Policies ; Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behaviour ; Technological Change; Research and Development

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