Chapter

Quantitative Evidence on Democratic Consolidation and International Organizations

Paul Poast and Johannes Urpelainen

in Organizing Democracy

Published by University of Chicago Press

Published in print April 2018 | ISBN: 9780226543345
Published online September 2018 | e-ISBN: 9780226543512 | DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226543512.003.0005
Quantitative Evidence on Democratic Consolidation and International Organizations

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This chapter continues the quantitative evaluation of our argument by subjecting to empirical evidence the claims that IOs can minimize the need for good fortune by performing mundane tasks that promote democratic consolidation and that IOs lack the coercive capacity necessary to stop autocratic reversals. The evidence shows that IO membership has a strong and positive influence on the prospects of democratic consolidation. But there are limits to what IOs can do for democratizing states. IO membership does nothing to deter authoritarian reversals in the absence of consolidation. Some things, such as preventing autocratic reversals, democratizing states must do for themselves. The chapter begins by offering several empirical implications and then proceeds to quantitatively test these implications. This entails developing a statistical method that accounts for both the self-selection of democratizing states into IOs and the unobservable nature of democratic consolidation.

Keywords: split-population model; selection models; consolidate as unobservable

Chapter.  7448 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: International Relations

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