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Ambiguity and social interaction

Jürgen Eichberger, David Kelsey and Burkhard C. Schipper.

in Oxford Economic Papers

April 2009; p ublished online September 2008 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Welfare Economics; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainy; Market Structure and Pricing. 9174 words.

A decision-maker is said to have an ambiguous belief if it is not precise enough to be represented by a single probability distribution. The pervasive assumption in game theoretic models in...

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Amendment Politics and Agenda Setting: A Theory with Evidence from the US House of Representatives

Daniel B Magleby, Nathan W Monroe and Gregory Robinson.

in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

March 2018; p ublished online January 2018 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Public Economics; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. 10483 words.

Abstract

Much recent work on legislative policy making has focused on the implications of agenda power. Yet, a critical step of the legislative process—floor...

Announcements as an equilibrium selection device

Nicola Acocella, Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, Andrew Hughes Hallett and Paolo G. Piacquadio.

in Oxford Economic Papers

January 2014; p ublished online April 2013 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Welfare Economics. 8179 words.

We address the coordination failures that arise in models with multiple equilibria and study how they may be resolved by reconsidering the role of cheap talk communication as an equilibrium...

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Arms Races and Negotiations

Sandeep Baliga and Tomas Sjöström.

in The Review of Economic Studies

April 2004; p ublished online April 2004 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; National Government Expenditures and Related Policies; Analysis of Collective Decision-making. 11574 words.

Two players simultaneously decide whether or not to acquire new weapons in an arms race game. Each player's type determines his propensity to arm. Types are private information, and are...

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Asymptotic Least Squares Estimators for Dynamic Games

Martin Pesendorfer and Philipp Schmidt-Dengler.

in The Review of Economic Studies

July 2008; p ublished online July 2008 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. 13483 words.

This paper considers the estimation problem in dynamic games with finite actions. we derive the equation system that characterizes the markovian equilibria. the equilibrium equation system...

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Auctions

in Game Theory

October 2007; p ublished online September 2013 .

Chapter. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. 4265 words.

‘Auctions’ examines the structure of auctions. Mechanism design allows principals to persuade their agents to behave in a certain way through regulations and incentives. Public asset...

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Bank Bailouts and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Germany

Lammertjan Dam and Michael Koetter.

in The Review of Financial Studies

August 2012; p ublished online April 2012 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Banking; Financial Regulation; Regulation and Industrial Policy. 16089 words.

We use a structural econometric model to provide empirical evidence that safety nets in the banking industry lead to additional risk taking. To identify the moral hazard effect of bailout...

Bargaining and coalitions

in Game Theory

October 2007; p ublished online September 2013 .

Chapter. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. 5198 words.

‘Bargaining and coalitions’ investigates cooperative game theory. Cooperative game theory is not the antithesis of noncooperative game theory. It simply assumes that players have solutions...

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Bargaining and Reputation: An Experiment on Bargaining in the Presence of Behavioural Types

Matthew Embrey, Guillaume R. Fréchette and Steven F. Lehrer.

in The Review of Economic Studies

April 2015; p ublished online September 2014 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Design of Experiments; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainy. 12742 words.

We conduct a series of laboratory experiments to understand what role commitment and reputation play in bargaining. The experiments implement the Abreu and Gul (2000) bargaining model that...

Bargaining and Reputation in Search Markets

Alp E. Atakan and Mehmet Ekmekci.

in The Review of Economic Studies

January 2014; p ublished online August 2013 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainy. 17262 words.

This article considers a two-sided search market where firms and workers are paired to bargain over a unit surplus. The matching market serves as an endogenous outside option for the...

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Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default

Vincent Anesi and Daniel J. Seidmann.

in The Review of Economic Studies

July 2015; p ublished online March 2015 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Analysis of Collective Decision-making. 23652 words.

Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron–Ferejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the...

A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and Takings

Thomas J. Miceli and Kathleen Segerson.

in American Law and Economics Review

January 2007; p ublished online June 2007 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Property Law; Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics; Regional Government Analysis. 4870 words.

The holdout problem is commonly cited as the justification for eminent domain, but the nature of the problem is not well understood. This article models the holdout problem in a bargaining...

Bayesian Learning in Social Networks

Daron Acemoglu, Munther A. Dahleh, Ilan Lobel and Asuman Ozdaglar.

in The Review of Economic Studies

October 2011; p ublished online March 2011 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainy. 15060 words.

We study the (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium of a sequential learning model over a general social network. Each individual receives a signal about the underlying state of the world, observes...

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Beliefs and Private Monitoring

Christopher Phelan and Andrzej Skrzypacz.

in The Review of Economic Studies

October 2012; p ublished online January 2012 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainy. 12310 words.

This paper develops new recursive, set based methods for studying repeated games with private monitoring. For any finite-state strategy profile, we find necessary and sufficient conditions...

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Board Structures Around the World: an Experimental Investigation

Ann B. Gillette, Thomas H. Noe and Michael J. Rebello.

in Review of Finance

March 2008; p ublished online October 2007 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Mergers and Acquisitions; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. 18257 words.

We model and experimentally examine the board structure–performance relationship. We examine single-tiered boards, two-tiered boards, insider-controlled boards, and outsider-controlled...

Buying Shares and/or Votes for Corporate Control

Eddie Dekel and Asher Wolinsky.

in The Review of Economic Studies

January 2012; p ublished online November 2011 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Mergers and Acquisitions; Analysis of Collective Decision-making. 16933 words.

We explore how allowing votes to be traded separately of shares may affect the efficiency of corporate control contests. Our basic set-up and the nature of the questions continue the work...

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Chance

in Game Theory

October 2007; p ublished online September 2013 .

Chapter. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. 3931 words.

‘Chance’ explores the application of mixed strategies. Mixed strategies involve a player randomizing their choice of pure strategy in order to keep their opponent guessing. This gives rise...

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Chilling, Settlement, and the Accuracy of the Legal Process

Ezra Friedman and Abraham L. Wickelgren.

in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

April 2010; p ublished online December 2008 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainy; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Law and Economics. 6184 words.

In this article, we ask the basic question: Is it necessarily the case that allowing or promoting settlement of lawsuits enhances social welfare? Our answer is not necessarily; there are...

Climate leadership by conditional commitments

Leif Helland, Jon Hovi and Håkon Sælen.

in Oxford Economic Papers

April 2018; p ublished online September 2017 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Design of Experiments; International Relations and International Political Economy; Environmental Economics; Publicly Provided Goods. 10705 words.

Abstract

Under the 2015 Paris climate agreement, each party sets its own mitigation target by submitting a Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) every five...

Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements

Kyle Hyndman and Debraj Ray.

in The Review of Economic Studies

October 2007; p ublished online October 2007 .

Journal Article. Subjects: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; Analysis of Collective Decision-making. 14013 words.

We study coalition formation in “real time”, a situation in which coalition formation is intertwined with the ongoing receipt of pay-offs. Agreements are assumed to be permanently binding:...

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